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DEMOCRACY AND CONGRESSIONAL TENURE
Steven R. Greenberger*
The story of the end of the twentieth century writ large is the advancing
triumph of democracy throughout the world. It is now possible to circumnavi-
gate the planet-crossing Russia, Eastern and Western Europe, North
America and back-without setting foot in a nation where popular sovereignty
is not the order of the day. In an irony so profound as to be unimaginable even
a few short years ago, the ultimate landmark of Communist tyranny, the Ber-
lin Wall, has been dismantled and is being sold in pieces by nascent entrepre-
neurs anxious to begin to order their own lives. This is not to say that the
recent march of freedom has been either uninterrupted or universal, or that
the tide is necessarily irreversible; the massacre of Chinese students at
Tienanmen Square and the reactionary putsch in the (former?) Soviet Union,
although thankfully unsuccessful, among other events, counsel caution in con-
cluding that totalitarian rule may confidently be consigned to the "dustbin of
history." Nevertheless, the sheer indomitability of the human spirit and thirst
for liberty evidenced by the willingness of ordinary citizens to stand up to
tanks after decades of living under dictatorial repression is cause for extended
celebration.
But if the global headline trumpets the ascendence of democracy, the twen-
tieth century fin de si~cle subtext in this country, according to James Otteson
and others, is that our own democracy, or at least democratic decision-making
in Congress, is foundering. Mr. Otteson, in A Constitutional Analysis of Con-
gressional Term Limits: Improving Representative Legislation Under the
Constitution,' at turns characterizes Congress as "inept," "ineffective," and,
most seriously, as having lost its "representative legitimacy."'2 As a conse-
quence, he argues that members of both Houses of Congress ought to be re-
stricted to a single term. As I argue below, I think that Mr. Otteson is mis-
taken in both his diagnosis and prescription: By and large Congress functions
effectively, and rather than enhancing representative legitimacy, term limita-
tions will serve only to weaken Congress, particularly vis-a-vis the other
branches of government. As a general proposition, however, it is well to ob-
serve that at a time when people throughout the world are risking their lives
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1. James C. Otteson, A Constitutional Analysis of Congressional Term Limits: Improving
Representative Legislation Under the Constitution, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1991).
2. Id. at 2, 13.
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for the right to freely choose their leaders, advocates of limitations on the
menu of available electoral choices must shoulder a heavy burden of
persuasion.
I. THE TEACHING OF THE CONSTITUTION
Article I of the Constitution establishes the formal framework for the or-
ganization of the national Congress in which the legislative powers enumer-
ated in the Constitution are vested. The organizational blueprint is somewhat
detailed. Congress is divided into the Senate and House of Representatives.
Members of the former are elected two from each state for six-year terms,
with one-third of their number elected every other year.3 Senators must be at
least thirty years old, United States citizens for nine years, and residents of
the states from which they are elected.' Representatives are elected biennially,
must be at least twenty-five, must have been United States citizens for seven
years and, interestingly, although they must represent districts of equal popu-
lation, need only reside in the state (rather than the district) from which they
are elected.' All members of Congress are now popularly elected.6
What is missing from the foregoing list, of course, is any restriction on the
length of time in Congress that senators and representatives may serve. That
omission from Article I represents a deliberate decision by the Framers of the
Constitution and not an oversight. They rejected the call for limitations similar
to the three-year term limitation of the Articles of Confederation 7 and the
limitations established by several state constitutions at the time.8 They chose
instead to let the electorate determine how long any particular member of
Congress should continue to serve.
Mr. Otteson's contention that the text and history of Article I support his
argument for congressional term limitations is accordingly curious; his position
was explicitly considered and rejected. While sliding over this rather difficult
truth, he nevertheless offers two alternative readings of Article I to support his
view, one serious and the other rather not. The latter focuses on the require-
ment that congresspeople reside in the states from which they are elected. He
suggests that the residency requirement is being flouted because the residence
of long-tenured lawmakers is now in reality Washington, D.C., rather than
3. U.S. CONST. art I. § 3, cl. 1-2.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
6. The members of the House of Representatives have always been popularly elected. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Senators were originally elected by state legislatures. U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. The 17th Amendment, ratified in 1913,
amended the Constitution to provide for the direct popular election of senators as well.
7. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 24 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter GUIDE TO
CONGRESS]; Timothy Egan, Building on Mistrust of Officials, Voters in West Try to Limit
Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991 (nat'l ed.), at Al.
8. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 8 (limiting legislators to no more than four terms in a
seven-year time period); VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 4 (providing for rotation of senators).
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their purported home states.0
This interpretation strikes me as silly, especially when assayed in historical
terms. Assuming arguendo that the residency requirement is intended to en-
sure that citizens are represented by individuals familiar with local conditions,
that familiarity is far less difficult to come by for a representative absent from
his local home while attending to the nation's business today than it was at the
end of the eighteenth century. Journeying to the national Capitol from remote
regions of the country was then an arduous task, not easily undertaken, and
communication over any appreciable distance was exclusively by mail. In the
contemporary age, characterized by instantaneous communication and super-
sonic travel, I suspect that for many lawmakers the problem is not that they
are unaware of what their constituents think, but instead that, particularly
concerning controversial issues, they are intimately aware and are summoned
home to explain their positions rather more regularly than they would like.
Mr. Otteson's somewhat weightier argument is that the grant of legislative
power in Article I ought to be informed by the purposes of the national gov-
ernment set forth in the Preamble.' 0 This seems unexceptionable as far as it
goes; federal law should help to "insure domestic Tranquility," "promote the
general Welfare," and "provide for the common defence"" (although, as we
will see, the assessment of whether those laudable goals have been furthered in
other than a process sense is probably not a meaningful inquiry). And it fol-
lows as well that if Congress, or for that matter any other branch or organ of
government, is demonstrably and systematically acting in a manner injurious
to the purposes for which the Constitution was ordained and established, then
reform is in order. Article V presumably proves that much.' 2 But notwith-
standing the current affection for the Preamble shown by Professor Amar, s
9. Otteson, supra note 1, at 15-16.
10. The Preamble provides:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, estab-
lish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
11. Id.
12. Article V establishes the manner in which the Constitution may be amended. It provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Consti-
tution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect
the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
13. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Arti-
cle V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1043, 1056-58 (1989); Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
19911
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among others, it is hard to see how it can possibly be viewed in this context as
anything other than an admonition. I know of no case that holds, or scholar
who contends, that the Preamble might trump a substantive constitutional pro-
vision; the Supreme Court could not order term limitations as a remedy in a
lawsuit claiming that Congress had failed to act, for example, to "insure do-
mestic Tranquility.""' Since limiting congressional tenure cannot be accom-
plished as a matter of constitutional interpretation and will, instead, probably
require constitutional change,' 5 the only real question is whether such a
change is a wise idea. I attempt to supply an answer to that question below.
II. THE CASE AGAINST TERM LIMITATIONS
The increasingly powerful populist appeal of term limitations is an undenia-
ble phenomenon. California, Colorado, and Oklahoma adopted such limita-
tions last year,"6 and referenda drives have been initiated in every other state
in the West, save Hawaii and New Mexico, for placement on the ballot next
year.' 7 The success of the term limitation movement is all the more remarka-
ble since, in light of the unsurprising antipathy of elected officials who are the
movement's targets, supporters must accomplish their objective through the
relatively more difficult mechanism of ballot initiatives rather than via
legislation.
Of the limits currently in effect, only Colorado's includes federal as well as
state officeholders.' 8 Colorado's senators and representatives are limited to a
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1455-62 (1987).
14. The Supreme Court would almost certainly refuse to entertain such an action because it
would pose a nonjusticiable political question outside the Court's institutional capacity to decide.
For an insightful treatment of the political question doctrine, see generally ALEXANDER BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1965).
15. It is a nice question, though beyond the scope of this Article to resolve, whether the states
may limit the terms of their federal representatives themselves or whether such limitations require
an act of Congress or a constitutional amendment. Section 4 of Article I empowers the state
legislatures to determine "[fthe Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for [United
States] Senators and Representatives," subject to Congress' right to supersede state regulation if
it so chooses. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. At the same time, Section 5 of Article I establishes each
house of Congress as "the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own mem-
bets." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Whether term limitations fall under Section 4 or Section 5 is not
prima facie clear. The limitation of the President to two terms was accomplished via the 22nd
Amendment, but that is not something the states could have accomplished in any event. For dis-
cussions of the constitutionality of term limitations, see LAURENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L.
SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 92-105 (1979); Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the
Time for All Good Men ..., 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, et al.,
Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 967 (1988).
16. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (amended 1990); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9 (amended 1990);
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17a (amended 1990).
17. Egan, supra note 7, at Al.
18. Article XVIII of the Colorado Constitution provides:
§ 9. U.S. senators and representatives-limitations on terms
(1) In order to broaden the opportunities for public service and to assure that mem-
bers of the United States Congress from Colorado are representative of and respon-
[Vol. 41:37
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total of twelve consecutive years in Congress, although those serving at the
time the limitations were imposed were exempted.19 Many of the proposed
initiatives in other states also include federal as well as state officials. 20 The
most draconian proposal will be taken up by the voters of Washington State in
November 1991. The Washington initiative will limit the terms of all the
state's legislators, state and federal, and of the governor. 2 1 State and federal
sive to Colorado citizens, no United States Senator from Colorado shall serve more
than two consecutive terms in the United States Senate, and no United States Repre-
sentative from Colorado shall serve more than six consecutive terms in the United
States House of Representatives. This limitation on the number of terms shall apply
to terms of office beginning on or after January 1, 1991. Any person appointed or
elected to fill a vacancy in the United States Congress and who serves at least one
half of a term of office shall be considered to have served a term in that office for
purposes of this subsection (1). Terms are considered consecutive unless they are at
least four years apart.
(2) The people of Colorado hereby state their support for a nationwide limit of
twelve consecutive years of service in the United States Senate or House of Repre-
sentatives and instruct their public officials to use their best efforts to work for such a
limit.
(3) The people of Colorado declare that the provisions of this section shall be
deemed severable from the remainder of this measure and that their intention is that
federal officials elected from Colorado will continue voluntarily to observe the wishes
of the people as stated in this section in the event any provision hereof is held invalid.
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9 (amended 1990).
19. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9, cl. I (amended 1990).
20. Egan, supra note 7, at Al.
21. The Washington initiative provides:
Initiative Measure 553
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 1. A new section is added to chapter 43.01 RCW to read as
follows:
A person elected to the office of governor or lieutenant governor is eligible to serve
not more than two consecutive terms in each office.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. A new section is added to chapter 44.04 RCW to read as
follows:
A person elected to the Washington state legislature is eligible to serve not more
than three consecutive terms in the house of representatives and not more than two
consecutive terms in the senate. In addition, no person may serve more than ten con-
secutive years in any combination of house and senate membership. Terms are consid-
ered consecutive unless they are at least six years apart. Therefore, elected legislators
who have reached their maximum term limits are eligible for legislative office after an
absence of six years from the state legislature. Persons who have already reached the
maximum term of service on the effective date of this act are eligible to serve one
additional term in either the state house of representatives or the senate.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 3 A new section is added to chapter 29.68 RCW to read as
follows:
A person elected to the United States congress from this state is eligible to serve
not more than three consecutive terms in the United States house of representatives
and not more than two consecutive terms in the United States senate and not more
than twelve consecutive years in any combination of United States house and senate
membership. Terms are considered to be consecutive unless they are at least six years
apart. Therefore, elected legislators who have reached their maximum term limits are
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House members will be restricted to a total of six years, the governor to eight,
eligible for legislative office after an absence of six years from the United States con-
gress. Persons who have already reached the maximum term of service on the effec-
tive date of this act are eligible to serve one additional term in either the United
States house of representatives or senate.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 4. If any provision of this act or its application to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the
provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected.
Supporting and opposing arguments accompany the initiative for the benefit of voters. Those
statements provide:
Statement For:
Term Limitation Is A Crucial Bi-partisan Government Reform
Vote YES for Initiative 553 for real political reform. That's why over a quarter
million Democrats, Republicans, and Independents signed this initiative. 1-553 will
solve a fundamental problem in our political system: the need to limit the number of
years a politician can stay in a particular office. Vote YES on 1-553 for necessary
government reform!
Return Control of OUR Government to the People-Where It Belongs
"Experienced" career politicians, financed by PACs and special interest money,
have brought us the S&L scandal, a $3 trillion national debt and elected officials'
excessive pay raises. Term limitation will make it more difficult for lobbyists to main-
tain their influence with elected officials. Our Founding Fathers envisioned citizen
legislators, not career politicians. Vote YES on 1-553 to reduce special interest
influence.
Reduce the Influence of Lobbyists and Special Interests
Re-election is a politician's top priority. Nothing proves it more than the outrageous
growth in campaign spending using PAC and special interest money. We have a sys-
tem where incumbents, who choose to run, nearly always win-96% re-elected to
Congress in 1990, 96% re-elected to the Washington State Legislature. Excellent
candidates are discouraged from running against incumbents. Vote YES on 1-553 to
provide opportunities for fair competition.
Term Limitation Is a National Movement
Our President and 31 governors have term limits. Oklahoma, Colorado and Califor-
nia passed term limits in 1990. Term limitation movements are underway in 22 states
for 1992. Nationally, incumbency has taken over our political system and voters are
staying home. Vote YES on 1-553 to regain meaningful choice at the voting booth,
locally and nationally.
Vote YES on 1-553 to assure a responsive citizen legislature.
Rebuttal of Statement Against:
Scare tactics and doomsaying are desperate maneuvers by career politicians who
don't want to give up their power and perks.
Thomas Jefferson was the original advocate for term limitations because he foresaw
the problems associated with the accumulation of power.
1-553 makes our representatives more accountable to us. What's so radical about
that? Ask yourself this question. If special interests and bureaucrats will flourish
under term limits, why are they so opposed to term limits?
For more information call (206) 475-8650.
Statement Against:
" Initiative 553 is a radical effort to reform politics which will do more harm than
good.
" Today we can choose which officials to keep and which have been there too long.
553 would take that choice away. Between 1979 and 1989 we turned over 81 % of
our legislature. Almost a quarter were new in 1991. Washington voters are turning
[Vol. 41:37
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and senators to twelve.22 Unlike in Colorado, however, current officeholders in
Washington will not be "grandfathered in" beyond a modest three-year re-
prieve extending only until November 1994.2' At that time the House career
of the Speaker, Thomas Foley, among others, will be brought to an end.
The limitation movement is undoubtedly reflective of a widespread percep-
tion of congressional ineffectiveness, of a national legislature hamstrung by the
need to curry favor with "special interests" to obtain reelection largesse, inter-
ested exclusively in self-preservation and unable or unwilling to respond to
what appear to be increasingly intractable social problems. The final straw for
many, including Mr. Otteson, was the so-called "budget fiasco" at the end of
1990, when government operations were halted for a time by the lack of agree-
ment on a deficit reduction package.24 But is this perception of congressional
shortcomings accurate? And by what measure is the performance of Congress
to be judged?
A. Congress and the Concept of Representative Legitimacy
One standard against which to evaluate Congress is the degree of its repre-
sentativeness of the citizenry. As a formal matter under Article I, representa-
tiveness means congresspeople must be elected by majority vote from their
incumbents out now. This initiative is a solution to a problem that doesn't exist.
* If 553 passes, we will lose all our Congressional delegation in 1994. Speaker of the
House Tom Foley and past giants such as Scoop Jackson, Dan Evans and Warren
Magnuson have protected us against powerful east coast interests. How will new-
comers have the clout to protect the electric rates and irrigation rights which under-
pin our economy? How can we prevent the closure of a Whidbey Island Naval Air
Station and keep supertankers out of Puget Sound? Do we want offshore oil drill-
ing? There's too much to lose.
* Without senior members, the Legislature will have less institutional memory, and
the influence of professional lobbyists and appointed bureaucrats will increase.
* 553 won't take big money out of campaigns. And it will actually reduce competi-
tion. Why run against an incumbent when you can wait for an automatic open seat?
* If 553 passes, we'll lose good people with the bad. And will the new ones be bet-
ter-or just know less?
Rebuttal of Statement For:
Term limitation is NOT a national movement. Only one state has done what Initia-
tive 553 would do. Most people recognize that to send newcomers to Congress while
other states don't would be to lose the power to protect the regional economy and
natural resources.
Initiative 553 will NOT reduce the influence of special interests. We need to take
big money out of campaigns. Initiative 553 will not do that.
You should decide who to vote for. Vote no on Initiative 553.
Initiative 553 (copies available through the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Washington).
22. Id. § 3.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Richard Morin, Majority in Post-ABC Poll Blames Crisis on Congress, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 9, 1990, at A8 (reporting that 57% of Americans surveyed blamed Congress for fail-
ure to reach agreement with administration on federal budget).
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jurisdiction of residence. 5 Congress is certainly representative in this impor-
tant sense; Article I's requirements serve at a minimum to ensure the people's
opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process via the election of their
congressional representatives. Moreover, the condition upon which the vicari-
ous exercise of popular sovereignty through the legislative process depends
most fundamentally-the right to vote-has been protected and expanded
enormously over time. The Fifteenth," Nineteenth,27 and Twenty-Fourth28
Amendments and the Voting Rights Act" have enfranchised millions of
Americans previously without an electoral voice. For the most part, the electo-
rate's decisions are also no longer subject to nullification by vote fraud of the
type that, in the past half-century, sent Lyndon Johnson to the Senate30 and
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
26. The 15th Amendment enfranchised the newly freed slaves. It provides:
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
27. The 19th Amendment enfranchised women. It provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
28. The 24th Amendment banned the use of poll taxes. It provides:
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice Presi-
dent, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or any State by any reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other
tax.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988). The Voting Rights Act is perhaps the most important civil rights
legislation ever enacted. It prohibits racial discrimination in voting by, inter alia, suspending the
use of literacy tests and other similar voting qualifications, mandating federal pre-approval of all
future changes in election law and practice in jurisdictions with a history of discrimination, excus-
ing payment of accumulated, unpaid poll taxes and supplying federal poll watchers to aid in
preventing violations. A century after the ratification of the 15th Amendment, the Voting Rights
Act finally made the Amendment's guarantee of the vote to African-Americans a reality.
30. The story of Lyndon Johnson's 1948 senatorial campaign is one of the most extraordinary
tales in the annals of American politics. Johnson "won" the Democratic primary, the only election
that mattered at that time in Texas, by a total of 87 votes, less than 1/100 of one percent of the
votes cast. Johnson's slim margin of victory was provided by a late change in the returns from a
remote south Texas region known as the "Valley." Originally, the counties in the Valley reported
several hundred fewer votes for Johnson than they later certified. The "corrected" Valley vote
total was not reported until six days after the election. One county in the Valley, Duval County,
reported its vote as 4,620 to 40 in favor of Johnson. The combined vote for Johnson and his
opponent represented a 99.6% turnout of the County's eligible voters! Johnson's theft of the 1948
election is fascinatingly chronicled in ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MEANS
OF ASCENT (1990).
[Vol. 41:37
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some say sent John Kennedy to the White House. 31
In addition to universal suffrage, constitutional representativeness also ar-
guably requires that the people's chosen representatives themselves not effec-
tively be disenfranchised within Congress. Regrettably, for much of the past
hundred years that was all too often the case. From its inception, Congress
borrowed the British parliamentary practice of introducing bills first on the
floor of the chamber and then referring them to committee for study, with the
committee then reporting the bills back for consideration by the entire body.3
Congressional committees were initially only temporary, dissolved when their
reporting function was complete. 3  By the end of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, committees had become a permanent fixture of the legislative landscape,
wielding broad power with such unbridled autonomy that "Congress was fre-
quently said to have abdicated its lawmaking function to its committees.134
By itself, committee control of the legislative process was perhaps not overly
worrisome; Congress' ability to respond to issues posed by the increase in eco-
nomic activity associated with the Industrial Revolution and the nation's terri-
torial expansion probably made an institutionalized division of labor into some
type of committee structure inevitable. What was troubling was the use of
seniority as the sole criterion for ranking members on committees, thereby
ensuring that the most senior member of the majority party always served as
the committee chairman." Coupled with the almost dictatorial power that
chairmen were afforded over committee operations, power and influence in
Congress became concentrated in the hands of a small group of superannuated
chairmen who reigned with virtual sovereignty over their respective realms. 6
Woodrow Wilson, then a professor of Government at Princeton, called the
structure "a government by the Standing Committees of Congress."3
The impact of the seniority system on the representativeness of Congress
was substantial, particularly during times of social change. Aged committee
chairmen were often out of step with their own committee members, congres-
sional leadership, Congress as a whole, and the national electorate.38 One no-
torious example was Representative Howard W. Smith, Chairman of the pow-
erful House Rules Committee during much of the civil rights movement in the
1950s and 1960s, who repeatedly bottled up widely supported civil rights legis-
lation. 6 It sometimes seemed as if a few old men were thwarting the will of
31. Richard Nixon certainly makes out at least a prima facie case, as have others, that vote
fraud in Chicago and Texas cost him the 1960 election. See RICHARD M. NIXON, R.N: THE
MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON (1990).
32. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESS A TO Z 85 (1988) [hereinafter CONGRESS A TO
Z].
33. Id.
34. Id. at 86.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 55-56 (1885).
38. CONGRESS A TO Z, supra note 32, at 86.
39. See NELSON W. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 149-52 (3d ed. 1976).
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the nation.
During the 1970s, however, Congress found reform, largely as a result of
pressure from the House Democrats who took office in the post-Watergate
election of 1974.40 Both parties in both chambers determined to choose their
committee leaders by vote of all party members in caucus.4' The House Demo-
cratic Caucus then proceeded to remove three chairmen in 1975, and removed
several others in ensuing years. 2 And while many senior chairmen 'remained,
all were aware that they were henceforth answerable for their actions to their
party's membership. Legislative power was also diffused by relieving chairmen
of exclusive control of committee resources, and by spreading the authority of
many committees among new subcommittees run by junior members.43 The
vote necessary to invoke cloture to end a filibuster in the Senate was also re-
duced from two-thirds to sixty percent.'4
The diffusion of power in Congress effected by these reforms has made Con-
gress a far more representative institution than it had historically been. It is no
longer the private preserve of a tiny group of tyrannical titans. Individual leg-
islators, and therefore the constituents they represent, now stand on a vastly
more equal footing with each other; voters represented by a relatively junior
legislator are no longer effectively voiceless. Moreover, as I pointed out above,
the people's aggregate ability to participate in the political process through
voting for and communicating with their representatives has also never been
greater. Measured against these criteria, Congress as an institution is quite
representative.
It is true that congressional reform has not come without a price. Sharing
power means that some of those who hold it must give some of it up. There is
then less reason for deference on the part of the newly empowered, and correl-
atively less ability to command deference by those whose power is reduced.
Thus, as control over the "tools" of "persuasion" in Congress-committee as-
signments, patronage, the placement of favored bills on the legislative calen-
dar-is more widely dispersed, leadership becomes more difficult. The former
Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, described himself as left by reform with
merely a "hunting license to persuade.' 45
Ultimately, a leadership shorn of its carrots and sticks may be hard put to
forge the consensus necessary to get legislation enacted. The breakdown of
party discipline, attributable to a weakened leadership, has, in fact, been (er-
roneously) cited as underlying Congress' inability to agree upon the fiscal 1991
budget.""
40. CONGRESS A TO Z, supra note 32, at 86.
41. id.
42. Id.
43. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 486.
44. Id. at 432-33.
45. Janet Hook, Budget Ordeal Poses Question: Why Can't Congress Be Led? 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3471, 3472 (1990).
46. Id.
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There may accordingly be something of an inherent tension in Congress be-
tween representativeness and effectiveness, although we know from the era
when the seniority system was in its heyday that the power to act also carries
with it the power to obstruct. For my part, I would gladly sacrifice a chunk of
effectiveness for a bit of representation. That is partly because I share the
Framers' bias against concentrations of power and partly because I do not
want to see a return to the Congress of the 1950s. But it is also because the
trade-off is not all that severe. As I argue below, the criticisms of Congress'
performance are, in my estimation, largely partisan and, on the whole,
mistaken.
B. Evaluating Congressional Effectiveness
Congress has never been, and never will be, a widely popular institution. In
many respects it suffers in comparison with the Executive: It is faceless. No
individual member commands the loyalty of more than a small fraction of the
national electorate. It is ponderous, not constituted to move swiftly. It cannot
act alone. Everything it accomplishes requires at least the acquiescence of the
President. It is the arena in which the competing preferences of the most di-
verse society in the world are compromised, and its actions as a whole will
never, therefore, be entirely satisfactory to anyone. It is an easy target.
Congress appears particularly impotent when it is not controlled by the
President's party. Unless it can mount veto-proof majorities, its role consists
largely in thwarting and parrying presidential initiatives. Particularly when
locked in combat over an extended period with a popular President armed with
a national electoral mandate that it necessarily lacks, Congress often seems
simply an obstacle to accomplishment of the President's agenda.4 7
This is, of course, precisely the state of affairs that has existed for much of
the last decade. Presidents Reagan and Bush have been popular Presidents
confronted by a Democratically controlled Congress. Owing to deep ideologi-
cal disagreements, Congress has opposed many of the Reagan-Bush policy ini-
tiatives. The more successfully Congress resisted those initiatives, the more
obstructionist it appeared, and the greater the perceived need in the Republi-
can Party to do something about it.
The fact of the matter is that much, although not all, of the agitation for
term limitations is coming from Republican and conservative groups.4 8 The
primary financier of the limitation movement in the Western states is an or-
ganization with conservative ties headquartered (ironically enough) in Wash-
ington, D.C., billing itself as "Citizens for Congressional Reform. '49 It has
provided almost all of the funding for the initiative in Washington State. 50
47. See, e.g., Godfrey Sperling, A Preview of Bush's 1992 Campaign, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONI-
TOR, Oct. 8, 1991, at 18.
48. See Egan, supra note 7, at A1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Press reports indicate that workers were being paid a bounty for each signa-
ture they obtained on petitions to place the initiative before the voters. 51 The
movement for congressional limitations has also been endorsed by President
Bush.52
That term limitations have been seized upon by Republicans as a short-cut
to achieving congressional ascendance for themselves does not mean that the
idea should necessarily be rejected as a mere partisan ploy. Not all advocates
of limitations are conservatives, and the movement has garnered too much
popular support to be dismissed out of hand.53 Like any other idea, it ought to
be evaluated on its merits. But the movement's primarily partisan cast, and
the easy Congress-bashing that has gone along with it, suggest that it ought to
be approached with caution. At a minimum, proponents of limitations must
demonstrate that for systemic reasons Congress is functioning in a manner
inimical to the national interest rather than merely passing laws they dislike or
failing to pass laws they do. And proponents then must show that limiting
tenure will cure the flaws they identify without making things worse. I submit
that they cannot do either.
As an initial matter, there is hardly a consensus on what the national inter-
est is. Promoting the general welfare sounds laudable but is an inadequate
practical guide to the resolution of particular policy disputes. Should the pend-
ing civil rights bill5 ' be enacted to guarantee workplace equity or rejected as a
quota bill unfairly disadvantaging whites? How much of the "peace dividend"
should be reallocated to domestic programs, and to which ones in what
amounts? Saying that Congress should choose whatever option furthers the
national interest is platitudinous. This, however, does not render the admoni-
tions of the Preamble meaningless. Aspects of congressional organization and
procedure that effectively disenfranchised voters, such as the old seniority sys-
tem, were justifiably changed for running afoul of the representativeness prin-
ciple embodied in Article I. But criticizing Congress for failure to act where
its inaction stems from ideological disagreement, whether internally or with
the Executive, as was the case, for example, with the FY 1991 budget, is just
playing politics.
Much of the work of contemporary public choice theorists confirms that the
notion of a general national interest understood as anything other than the
aggregate outcomes of the political process is illusory.55 The legislature is the
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17 (noting that Colorado, California, and Oklahoma
adopted tenure limitations last year, and referenda drives have been initiated in numerous other
western states.
54. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also proposed amendments to H.R. 1: S. 1409,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1408, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1407, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991).
55. The seminal works of public choice theory are probably KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) and DUNCAN BLACK. THE THEORY OF COMMIT-
TEES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
[Vol. 41:37
DEMOCRACY AND TENURE
designated vessel within which the claims of competing interest groups are
resolved, but it is incapable of adjusting those claims against some higher,
external standard. Legislative purpose is simply not a meaningful concept.
While public choice is not without its critics,"0 it does suggest that, so long as
universal participation in the system is assured, the search for a nonpolitical
definition of the national interest is futile.57
At this point, one might respond that I have contrived to make my oppo-
nents' job impossible. If they must prove that Congress is acting inimically to
the national interest, but the national interest is not susceptible of definition,
then I may win the debate, but only by default. I do not believe this to be the
case. My contention is merely that they must advance process- rather than
outcome-based arguments in support of their position. I believe that there are
some important such arguments, although their explication and evaluation is
best undertaken as part of my later discussion of the effect the imposition of
term limitations would have upon our constitutional system. However, because
the fate of limitations proposals will be determined in the political arena, and
outcome-based arguments are being made, it is worth briefly examining Con-
gress' recent performance.
The last Congress enacted important legislation to, inter alia, make the en-
vironment cleaner,5 8 aid children59 and bring Americans with disabilities into
the workplace.8 0 It carefully and deliberately performed its constitutional role
of deciding whether we should go to war in the Persian Gulf,6" in what many
56. As an application of economic analysis to the actions of legislatures, public choice is subject
to all of the familiar criticisms leveled at the law and economics movement generally: the underes-
timation of the extent of market failure; the overemphasis on quantification of nonmonetary inter-
ests; and the application of macroeconomic principles to microeconomic decision-making. For a
primer on public choice, see DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Other sources on public choice include William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89
MICH. L. REV. 875 (1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican
Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990); Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting Public-Regarding Leg-
islation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223
(1986).
57. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988) (suggesting that even
public interest legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may profitably be understood as
the bargain of competing interest groups rather than as the reflection of a transcendent national
purpose). In its rejection of intent and purpose, public choice theory is somewhat reminiscent of
Justice Brandeis' criticism and rejection of the notion of a transcendent body of federal law in
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-
7671 (West 1991)).
59. See Augustus F. Hawkins Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
501, 104 Stat. 1222 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9834 (West 1991)) (increasing funding for Head
Start program from $1 billion in 1990 to $2 billion in 1991, $4 billion in 1992, $5 billion in 1993,
and $7 billion in 1994).
60. See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1991)).
61. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to declare war. U.S. CONST. art.
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on both sides of the aisle and throughout the nation described as the finest
debate they had ever seen.62 And perhaps most impressively in light of the
pork-barreling charge so often leveled against it, and the catastrophic effects
that closing military bases will have in some of the members' states and dis-
tricts, Congress agreed with remarkably little rancor upon a schedule for clos-
ing military bases rendered superfluous by the end of the Cold War.63 If it is
possible to speak in terms of the national interest divorced from partisan polit-
ics, then all of these actions furthered it.
As I have intimated at several points above, perhaps the principal criticism
of Congress has been its perceived inability to bring the federal deficit under
control. To all appearances, we are indeed living beyond our means. As a per-
centage of the gross national product, federal borrowing during the 1980s
reached the highest peacetime level in history. 4 In the last ten years, the total
national debt has grown from one-quarter to over one-half of GNP, higher
than at any time since the mid-1950s.6 5 We are now $3 trillion in the red.66
Term limitation proponents, including Mr. Otteson, lay the blame for the
spiraling national debt at the feet of Congress. 67 The alleged problem is that
Congress spends too much, primarily because members benefit individually
from spending on government projects in their districts but are not held ac-
countable for fiscal policy as a whole. They are also unwilling to oppose
projects favored by their colleagues for fear of retribution against their own
projects. And they will not pass tax increases to pay the bill for fear they will
be voted out of office. So they borrow the money, increasingly from foreign
investors.6 "
This story has considerable intuitive appeal, but it just is not an accurate
account of national fiscal policy over the past decade. First, a deficit itself is
not inherently bad. Keynes taught us that. 9 It depends on how the money is
spent. Just as prudent citizens often borrow substantial sums to invest in them-
selves in order to obtain an education to enhance their future productivity, so,
too, should the government borrow funds to enhance our collective productiv-
ity by improving our educational and economic infrastructure when necessary.
A representative who secures funds, for example, to open a job retraining
I, § 8, cl. 11.
62. See. e.g., David S. Broder, Bravo Congress, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1991, at A21; Round
One-and Beyond; The Suspense, at Least, is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at A30
(editorial).
63. See, e.g., Pain, Limited. Bases, Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1991, at A20 (editorial).
64. ROBERT S. MCINTYRE, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, INEQUALITY & THE FEDERAL BUDGET
DEFICIT 1 (1991) (hereinafter CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE].
65. Id. at 1, 2.
66. Francis X. Clines, Kremlin to Look for Investments at London Summit, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 1991, at Al.
67. Otteson, supra note 1, at 17-18.
68. Id. at 17.
69. See JOHN M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY (1930) (establishing the importance of defi-
cit finance as a countercyclical tool to combat a slowdown in economic growth); JOHN M. KEYNES,
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1935) (same).
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center for laid off workers in his district may be acting partly out of self-
interested concern for his own reelection, but that doesn't mean the project is
a bad idea.
Second, budgetary "pork," in the sense of local public works projects, is a
decreasing rather than increasing share of the federal budget.7 0 Aside from
defense expenditures, which have always had a major local impact but are
being slashed,7' most of the budget is devoted to entitlements. 72 With the pos-
sible exception of states like Florida and Arizona, which have a disproportion-
ate number of social security recipients, spending on entitlements does not
benefit particular congresspeople.
Third, and by far most importantly, total spending on federal programs as a
share of GNP, including defense, is lower than at any time since 1960. 71
While total federal GNP-adjusted spending is in fact approaching record
levels, more than half of the spending increase over the past ten years is attrib-
utable to increased interest on the national debt.74 Of course, the increase in
interest obligations reflects the cost of prior deficits, in this case run up during
the early 1980s. 75 By definition, expenditures exceeded revenues during those
years. Who was responsible for that?
The answer, beyond debate, is President Reagan. The early 1980s were the
heyday of supply-side economics. Armed with an overwhelming mandate from
the voters in the 1980 election, 76 the GOP's newly established control of the
Senate, and a substantially reduced Democratic majority in the House, the
Reagan Administration pushed through enormous tax cuts for the wealthy. 77
The Administration claimed that the cuts would be self-financing: The reduc-
tion in marginal rates at the top would spur an investment boom so large that
the revenue loss from the dip in rates would be offset by a huge increase in
total taxable income.79 Indeed, the claim was not merely that the lost revenue
would be made up, but that total tax receipts to the Treasury would actually
increase.7
9
70. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 64, at 3.
71. See Eric Pianin, The Budget Pact: Worst of Both Worlds?, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at
A19 (noting a 25% cut in defense spending mandated by 1990 budget pact).
72. See, e.g., Budget Kudzu, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at A24 (editorial noting that entitle-
ments account for 75% of non-defense and non-debt-maintenance spending).
73. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 64, at 3.
74. Id. at 10.
75. Id.
76. David S. Broder, Carter Yields Early in Night; Ronald Reagan Elected in a Landslide of
Electoral Votes, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1980, at Al (reporting a Reagan landslide in electoral votes
and decisive victory in popular vote); Hedrick Smith, Reagan Easily Beats Carter' Republicans
Gain in Congress; D'Amato and Dodd Are Victors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1980, at Al (same).
77. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Alan L. Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in the
Individual Income Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 429 (1983) (analyzing how the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 would benefit the rich).
78. DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS 44-76 (1986).
79. Id.
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As we know, this never happened. The supply-side tax cuts cost the Trea-
sury billions of dollars and failed to spur increased investment or savings.80
Instead, the revenue shortfall was covered with borrowed dollars, an estimated
164 billion of them." A recent, nonpartisan study of the deficit concludes that
"the [supply-side] tax cuts for the richest one percent can explain the entire
increase in the size of the federal budget deficit [during the 1980s]. ' 82
It was against this background that the FY 1991 budget negotiations took
place. The Democrats were determined to restore more progressiveness to the
tax code, as had been started with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.83 The Repub-
licans, at least at the outset, took their cue from President Bush's lips and
were unwilling to assent to a deficit reduction package that smacked of a tax
increase. Both sides were acting from deep ideological conviction. Eventually,
the President convened a budget summit with the Democratic congressional
leadership. The President retreated from his campaign pledge and the leader-
ship compromised on the top marginal tax rate.84 Unhappy with the summit
agreement, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans initially refused to
go along. Finally, however, a compromise acceptable to a majority of each
house of Congress and the President was hammered out, passed, and signed
into law.8 5
That compromise, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, estab-
lished annually decreasing deficit targets and overall federal spending limits
for the following five years.8  The limits are enforced on a "pay-as-you-go"
basis: any legislation that would increase spending or lead to a revenue
shortfall must be equally offset by a tax increase or spending cut in another
bill or provision; if not, then automatic spending cuts take effect.87 The deficit
reduction pact further divided the budget into categories of expenditure and
provided that savings realized in one category could not be applied to allow
greater spending in another.8 Without the spending cuts and additional reve-
nues of the Act, the estimated deficit in 1996 would be approximately $150
billion greater than under current estimates.8 9 Hopefully, we are now on the
path to putting our financial house in order.
This is not to overlook the fact that we remain saddled with deficits still in
the hundreds of billions of dollars. The tab for our decade of hedonistic con-
80. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 64, at 12, 13.
81. Id. at 8.
82. Id.
83. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
84. Nathaniel C. Nash, Here's a Twist: Gains Tax is Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1990, at
DI; The Budget Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1990, at A20.
85. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified
in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
86. Id.
87. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 632(b)(7), 900-907 (West 1991).
88. Id.
89. David Hage, Budget Ties That Bind, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 1991, at 52.
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sumption will be paid off much more slowly than it was run up, although our
lessening need to spend on military security should help balance the books.
Nor was it pleasant to watch prolonged partisan wrangling or suffer the incon-
venience of a shutdown in government operations while the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 was being stitched together.9" On the other hand,
as anyone who has ever been involved in a labor negotiation will attest,
brinkmanship can be an important part of securing one's objectives. Yes, the
budget fight often looked ugly. But in our constitutional system of separated
powers, particularly when the legislative and executive branches are controlled
by opposing parties, some conflict is inevitable, and maybe even desirable, es-
pecially when both sides are acting to implement strongly held values. Politics
may be the art of compromise, but a politician who does nothing more than
compromise will never be more than a "politician."
To summarize, then, criticism of Congress' role both in creating and reme-
dying the deficits of the 1980s is, at best, exaggerated. The deficits resulted
from tax breaks for the rich, which Congress largely opposed 91 and which did
not lift all boats as advertised.92 Perhaps Congress should have fought the sup-
ply-side zealots more vigorously, but the supply-siders argued at the time that
theirs was the policy the electorate had endorsed in 1980. And they may well
have been right: While there is no such thing as a free lunch, that does not
stop people from looking-or voting-for one. Later, when the bill came due,
Congress acted to pay it, but insisted that those who had eaten the meal pay
their fair share. Congress' role in establishing fiscal policy over the past decade
may not be praiseworthy, but it does not warrant the imposition of term limi-
tations as a sanction.
C. Term Limitations and the Separation of Powers
There are two additional interrelated, process-based arguments put forward
by limitations supporters that I have deferred addressing until now. The first
asserts that the perquisites of office unfairly tilt the playing field in favor of
incumbents. An incumbent's skillful use of the franking privilege, performance
of casework for constituents, bringing of federal dollars into the district, and
garnering of media attention are said to make mounting a viable campaign in
opposition virtually impossible.98 Second, campaign money flows disproportion-
ately to incumbents as well, enhancing their natural advantage and, even more
90. Tourists who traveled to Washington, D.C., during the shutdown were particularly irked to
discover that the Washington Monument as well as memorials and museums were closed. One
visitor, upon finding the National Zoo grounds open but all of the animal houses closed, remarked:
"I was in the Senate Gallery for an hour and a half last night, watching them do caucuses and roll
calls and talk about the budget. And I saw more monkeys there than I could ever see at the zoo."
Maureen Dowd, The Budget Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, at Al.
91. Pamela G. Gunn, What Has Happened to the Tax Legislative Process?, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1196, 1199 (1988).
92. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 64, at 13.
93. Otteson, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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perniciously, rendering them beholden to those (read "special interests") who
provide it." Congress is thereby rendered less representative than it should be.
The favorite statistic that limitations supporters cite in support of these ar-
guments is that incumbents who chose to run for reelection in 1990 had a
virtual lock on their seats: 96% were reelected. 9" While this statistic does
speak moderately to the power of incumbency in the last election, it also
should assuage a bit of the concern about the influence of special interests. If
incumbents are in no realistic danger of being defeated, then they need not be
concerned with acquiescing to the demands of special interests (or anyone
else).9" Judged historically, however, the 1990 election was an aberration. Half
of the House of Representatives has turned over in the last decade,97 eighty
percent since 1974.9" The average tenure of House members in the last Con-
gress was a little over ten years." Moreover, as is the case decennially, reap-
portionment in 1992 to conform congressional districts to the results of the
1990 census100 will perforce bring a host of new faces into Congress. There is
thus considerable turnover in Congress now. To that extent, term limitations
solve a problem that does not exist.
This is not to say that the perquisites of incumbency ought not be checked
nor the influence of special interest money in politics be curbed, although iden-
tifying who a special interest is poses much the same difficulty as defining
where the national interest lies. Are realtors a special interest when they lobby
for the deduction of interest on home mortgages that benefits millions of
homeowners? Are the elderly when they press for social security increases?
Environmentalists when they seek protection for forests they camp in or the
loggers trying to protect their jobs who oppose them? My own inclination is to
be careful about affixing the pejorative special interest label and let the politi-
cal process sort out competing claims on the nation's attention and fisc. If
money is permitting some to speak in that process with an unfairly loud voice,
then perhaps campaign finance reform is in order. 1 Or, better yet, guarantees
94. Id. at 19.
95. Chuck Alston, Warning Shots by Voters More Mood Than Moderate, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3796, 3797 (1990).
96. The assertion in the text depends, of course, upon the relationship of the size of campaign
war chests to electoral success. If the high reelection rate for incumbents in the last election is
predominantly attributable to their overflowing coffers, either directly because the money was
spent and made a difference in the election or indirectly because it discouraged strong potential
challengers from making the race, then the influence of special interest money should not be
discounted. But the assertion that the amount of money spent on a given campaign might actually
affect the outcome is wholly speculative, and my assertion in the text is no more or less
speculative.
97. Telephone Interview with Casey Miller, Assistant to House Speaker Thomas Foley (Sept.
26, 1991) (statistics based on original research by Mr. Miller).
98. Egan, supra note 7, at A13.
99. Mark V. Tushnet et al., Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66
TEX. L. REV. 967, 976 (1988).
100. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
101. On the topic of campaign finance reform, see generally GARY C. JACOBSON. MONEY IN
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of broadcast media access to all candidates, which is the most important com-
modity money now buys.108 But congressional tenure has no direct bearing on
the problem of money in politics.
Term limitations are not merely beside the point. They will further exacer-
bate the problems they are intended to cure. First, the power of special inter-
est lobbyists to manipulate Congress will increase when the lobbyists have pri-
marily impotent lame ducks and guileless rookies to seduce. If campaign
money buys the loyalty of some in Congress now, wait until the institution is
populated exclusively with politicians compelled to feed at the special interest
trough because they lack the stature to run on their accomplishments. Second,
there will be a substantial loss of institutional memory. It cannot help but
hamper Congress' ability to address our increasingly complex social and eco-
nomic problems when the entire institution is moved down several notches on
the learning curve. Third, the quality of people willing to serve in Congress
will likely suffer. Politics is a tough business. Those who enter it do so at
substantial cost to their personal lives, and sometimes their finances, and at
the risk of suffering the public humiliation of defeat. Most do so out of a
desire to make the world conform more to their own image of how it should
be. Deprived of enough time to ascend in Congress sufficiently to realize those
dreams, the most talented will avail themselves of other opportunities.
The most serious danger, though, is the threat that term limitations pose to
the equilibrium among the branches of government in our tripartite system of
divided and separated powers. In recent years Congress has been under a sus-
tained assault from the other branches. Turf fights between Congress and the
Executive are certainly nothing new; they share constitutional power in several
areas, for example the authority to make war,103 and overlapping authority
naturally leads to tension and conflict. What has changed is the judiciary's
open willingness to act with the Executive to constrict congressional power, in
particular to limit Congress' most fundamental power, its Article I power to
make law.
The Supreme Court has acted to limit the scope of Congress' lawmaking
authority by reading statutes narrowly so as not to reach conduct that Con-
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 33-50 (1980); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective
on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045 (1985); Stephen
E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213
(1989); Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989); Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign
Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (1987); Marlene
A. Nicholson, The Supreme Court's Meandering Path in Campaign Finance Regulation and
What it Portends for Future Reform, 3 J.L. & POL. 509 (1987).
102. See John M. Sylvester, Note, Equalizing Candidates' Opportunities for Expression, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (1982) (advocating limited free access to broadcast media for campaign
expression and public financing of congressional campaigns).
103. Article I vests Congress with the power to declare war. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Article II makes the President the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. U.S. CONST. art. 11, §
2.
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gress intended the statutes to cover.10' This narrowing is accomplished under
the guise of giving statutes their "plain meaning," eschewing consultation of
anything other than the words themselves, especially legislative history, which
might provide an insight into Congress' intent. The Court's "textualist" ap-
proach has come in for considerable scholarly comment and criticism, includ-
ing my own .1 5 The point for present purposes is that the Court is steadfastly
refusing to implement legislative choices. This is particularly true in the civil
rights area, where Congress has found it necessary to overrule eight different
Supreme Court decisions in the past dozen years.'06
At the same time the Court has placed Congress' intent and purpose off-
limits in interpreting statutes, it has treated administrative agency views of
statutory meaning as binding. The Court held in Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc.10 7 that "where a statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue ... [agency] regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute."' 1 8 This rule of construction is not especially troubling where
Congress has explicitly delegated the power to define statutory terms to the
relevant agency. Where Congress has not done so, however, the Court is effec-
tively permitting presidentially appointed agency officials to decide what Con-
gress meant, substantially undercutting Congress' authority vis-a-vis the
President.
Unlike when it interprets the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not
have the final word on statutory meaning;' 0 9 Congress does retain the preroga-
tive of overruling erroneous readings by passing additional statutes. Legisla-
tively overruling court decisions, however, is difficult even in the best of cir-
cumstances. Where the President agrees with the Supreme Court's view and
Congress must muster the two-thirds majority necessary to override a veto," 0
the task is even harder. But if Congress becomes a revolving door, its ability to
wage a prolonged battle to protect itself from the encroachments of the other
branches will be virtually nil: There will not be anyone on Capitol Hill with
sufficient incentive to fight.
Thus, the imposition of term limitations will, in my view, inexorably lead to
a shift in the balance of power away from Congress toward the other two
104. See Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62
U. COLO. L. REV. 37 (1990).
105. Id.; see also, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MicH.
L. REV. 20 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405
(1989); Nicholas A. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
106. These cases are collected and analyzed in Greenberger, supra note 104, at 38-51.
107. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
108. Id. at 843-44.
109. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
110. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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branches of government."' That is clearly a development that some now seek
and will applaud. For my part, I do not believe such a relative weakening of
Congress bodes well. Whatever its shortcomings, Congress is the institution of
national government that most reflects and best represents our diversity as a
nation.
CONCLUSION
Underlying the arguments of limitations proponents is a sense of paradise
lost. Their ideal remains the citizen legislator envisioned by the Framers, who
sows his fields before he travels to the Capitol to take up the nation's business
with his fellow citizens in the Spring, and hurries home to complete his harvest
in the Fall. For better or worse, the press of the nation's business has rendered
this vision obsolete. Term limitations will not recapture it, and they are likely
to do substantial harm. Let's leave well enough alone.
111. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
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